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Abstract 
Economic resilience is essential to better withstand adverse shocks and reduce the 
economic costs associated with them. We propose different measures of resilience and 
empirically gauge how countries differ in their shock absorption capacity, while 
controlling for the quality of their economic structures. The paper finds robust evidence 
that sound labour and product markets, framework conditions and political institutions 
increase resilience to adverse shocks and reduce the incidence of crisis more generally. 
In the presence of a common shock, a country with weaker economic structures can, 
on average, suffer up to twice the output loss in a given year compared to a country 
with sound institutional parameters. Similarly, the likelihood of a severe economic crisis 
is reduced significantly if a country exhibits flexible and adaptable institutions. The 
proposed measures can be used to establish a governance process towards more 
resilient economic structures, as suggested for the euro area in the so-called Five 
Presidents’ Report.  
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Towards More Resilient Economies:  
The role of well-functioning economic structures 
David Sondermann* 
CEPS Working Document No. 2017-03 / January 2017 
Non-technical summary 
Economic resilience is essential to better withstand adverse shocks and reduce the economic 
costs associated with them. Limited economic resilience is often related to weak national 
economic structures. In particular, rigidities in labour markets, limited competition in product 
markets, framework conditions that impede the entry of new firms and complicate the daily 
business of existing firms, as well the quality of government services (e.g. rule of law, absence 
of corruption) are often considered to be the main obstacles to high shock absorption capacity.  
The main objective of this study is to present a broad analytical framework to measure the 
resilience of euro area countries, with a focus on the importance of the quality of national 
economic structures. Based on these insights, we propose a method for establishing a policy 
monitoring process, which draws both on structural indicators and observable macroeconomic 
variables.  
Resilience is understood here as the capacity to minimise output losses once an adverse shock 
hits the economy. Empirically, we identify resilience in two different ways. First, we gauge the 
degree of resilience by identifying the reaction to common shocks, by employing different shock 
identification methods. Second, we look at the incidence of crises, measured as a pronounced 
fall in GDP. In both cases, we show how countries’ resilience depends on the quality of its 
economic structures. 
Economic structures are measured by a wide set of institutional indicators that capture how the 
different markets (labour and product) work, how framework conditions are set (e.g. the 
efficiency of the judicial system, the strength of the regulatory environment, and the number of 
administrative burdens), and how the government interacts with the economy (i.e. the 
efficiency of public sector and tax administration, state rights).  
We find robust evidence that strong and flexible institutions increase their resilience to adverse 
shocks. For a common shock, a country with less efficient economic structures can suffer up to 
twice the output loss in a given year, on average, compared to a country that is at the frontier 
                                                             
* David Sondermann, European Central Bank (david.sondermann@ecb.int). This paper presents the 
author’s personal opinion and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Central Bank. The 
author would like to thank Edmund Moshammer and Macro Langiulli for their valuable research 
assistance, and Beatrice Pierluigi, Isabel Vansteenkiste and two anonymous referees from the ECB and 
CEPS for helpful comments and suggestions. An earlier version of the paper has been published in the ECB 
Working Paper Series, as no. 1984.  
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of institutional parameters. Similarly, other empirical results show that the likelihood of a severe 
economic crisis is significantly reduced if a country has more flexible and adaptable institutions.  
We use these empirical results to draw policy conclusions, in particular in light of the current 
debate on strengthening economic governance in the euro area. In the Five Presidents’ Report, 
Juncker et al (2015) call for a “convergence process towards more resilient economic 
structures”. In this context, the above exercise can be used to inform policymakers on which 
structural variables should be targeted to increase country resilience and how these variables 
should be reconciled with developments in observable macroeconomic data.  
1. Motivation and literature overview 
The euro area financial and sovereign debt crisis underlined the importance of economic 
resilience. It showed that flexible economies inside a monetary union are more resilient to 
negative shocks than rigid economies. The cost of high rigidities can be understood when 
comparing the adjustment in a more flexible country like Ireland with other (former) programme 
countries. In Ireland, the adjustment of relative wages and prices came immediately after the 
2008-09 recession, i.e. it had occurred before Ireland entered in the financial assistance 
programme in late 2010. As a result, an export-driven recovery started already in 2011, while 
the unemployment rate started to decline in 2012. This is very different from what happened in 
Greece, Portugal and Spain where the nominal adjustment started many years after the 
recession, forcing the adjustment via a sharp increase in unemployment. These case studies 
suggest that well-functioning national economic structures are essential to economic resilience 
in all countries. 
Moreover, resilience is not only in the interest of national economies, given possible spill-over 
effects to neighbouring countries. Limited resilience has the potential to negatively affect the 
smooth functioning of a monetary union as a whole, as the euro area financial and sovereign 
debt crisis has shown. Negative shocks propagate more rapidly inside the Union through strong 
trade and financial linkages, the confidence channel, the common external exchange rate and 
the single monetary policy. Nominal and real rigidities in turn can amplify and increase the 
persistence of spill-over effects, as rigidities affect the ability of a country to adjust to shocks. 
In this paper, we understand resilience as the capacity of a country to withstand significant 
adverse shocks by minimising the impact on economic activity. We assume that well-functioning 
economic structures and sound political institutions increase the shock absorption capacity of a 
given country. We measure resilience in two different ways. First, we measure it directly by 
looking at common shocks and the immediate country-specific reaction to them. Second, we 
measure it indirectly, by focusing on the likelihood that a country enters in periods of particularly 
strong declines in output. For both approaches we control for the quality of the national 
economic structures with a view to explain differences in resilience. 
The literature linking economic structures to economic resilience is relatively scarce. The role of 
high-quality basic political institutions (such as the rule of law or the political stability) for a 
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better shock absorption has, for example, been studied by Acemoglu et al. (2003) and Rodrick 
(1999). Acemoglu et al. find that countries with weak institutions suffer substantially more 
volatility as measured by the standard deviation of per capital output. Rodrik (1999), in turn, 
notes that external shocks on growth are larger the greater the latent social conflicts in an 
economy and the weaker its institutions of conflict management. 
Other papers have focused only on the importance of well-functioning product and labour 
markets for economic resilience. Canavo et al (2011) rely on common GDP shocks, filtered by 
time series methods. They look at sectoral data across European countries and find that a high 
level of product market regulation makes industries less resilient to adverse shocks. They show 
that the different capacity to absorb shocks within industrial sub-sectors seems to be largely 
explained by how far product market reforms have advanced. Duval and Vogel (2008) conduct 
a similar analysis, however, focusing on the persistence of shocks in the output gap. Their 
simulations indicate that rigid labour and product markets lengthen the time it takes for output 
to return to potential following a shock, and increase the cumulative output loss incurred over 
the period. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) focus on the role of labour market institutions in the 
wake of common shocks. They find that the interaction between shocks and institutions is crucial 
to explaining the heterogeneous evolution of unemployment across EU countries. Biroli et al 
(2010) also look at economic resilience through the lenses of the competitiveness channel across 
euro area countries. They find that excessive regulations in product and labour markets appear 
to make inflation differentials more persistent in the face of a common shock. This implies that 
in a monetary union where the nominal exchange rate channel as a mode of adjustment is no 
longer available, the working of the competitiveness channel is impeded by highly regulated 
labour and product market structures, thereby preventing an automatic smoothing of shocks at 
country level.  
In addition to the empirical literature, the crisis has prompted an increased policy focus on the 
need to determine factors improving economic resilience. The OECD recently started a work 
stream to better understand economic resilience.1 Surveillance across OECD countries is meant 
to be strengthened by identifying vulnerabilities to shocks and crises early on so as to reduce 
their likelihood and economic cost. In this vein, the OECD team proposes a large set of mainly 
macro and financial vulnerability indicators (see Röhn et al 2015) which could be used as an early 
warning tool (Hermansen and Röhn 2015). 
Also at EU level there is an increased focus on improving resilience. The EU, and specifically the 
euro area economic governance framework, so far seems insufficiently equipped to enforce a 
more effective reform path towards more resilient structures. It is against this background that 
the report “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union” authored by the ‘Five 
Presidents’ (Juncker et al., 2015) explicitly calls for a binding convergence process towards more 
resilient economic structures. 
                                                             
1 See: www.oecd.org/economy/growth/economic-resilience.htm. 
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This paper adds to the existing literature by employing different definitions of resilience 
(including combining alternative shock identification methods), using a broad range of indicators 
to identify the well-functioning of economic structures (covering the efficiency of labour and 
product market policies as well as framework conditions of doing business and the interaction 
between the government and the economy), utilising a large panel dataset of OECD countries 
over nearly 35 years, and by suggesting how the identified structural variables could be read in 
conjunction with related macro variables, facilitating the monitoring towards more resilient 
economic structures. 
Section 2 elaborates on the concept of economic structures and establishes a link to the shock 
absorption capacity of a country, before section 3 establishes the empirical evidence for this 
relationship. Building on the empirical findings of the previous section, section 4 proposes how 
the identified structural variables could be related to observable macro variables, which 
together could inform national (and euro area) policymakers about progress on converging 
towards similarly resilient economic structures.  
2. Economic structures and resilience: concepts and indicators used 
We argue that the quality of economic structures impact the shock absorption capacity of a 
country. Economic structures are defined as a broad set of institutional indicators that capture 
how labour and product markets work and how framework conditions are set, including the 
quality of government or how the government interacts with the economy at large. 
In market economies, regulations try to prevent market failure and therefore play a significant 
role in determining economic structures. If a market does not function well, such as in cases of 
natural monopoly in network industries, it might be beneficial to regulate the market. But too 
much regulation can create the wrong incentives for investors, firms and employees, so that 
labour or capital is not used where it is most efficient from a welfare perspective. Such excessive 
regulation (often an expression of unjustified protection) could, among other factors, hinder a 
swift response to adverse shocks.  
Labour market regulations affect the rate of job creation and destruction, productivity, wages, 
and the extent of social benefits and employment protection. Such regulations could be 
important to safeguard workers or to encourage productivity growth (through training and the 
development of firm-specific skills). By contrast, excessive regulation impedes the timely 
adjustment of firms and employees to economic shocks by discouraging hiring and favouring the 
employed over the unemployed.  
Measuring the efficiency of labour markets is difficult given the various policies at work and the 
need to balance regulations carefully. In this paper, several commonly used indicators of labour 
market regulations (from the OECD, the Global Competitiveness Index, Heritage and Fraser 
institutes) are compared. They capture de jure aspects, i.e. the quality of the legislation (e.g. 
OECD Employment Protection Legislation Index) and also de facto aspects, i.e. how the actual 
working of the labour market regulations is perceived (the Global Competitiveness Index, the 
TOWARDS MORE RESILIENT ECONOMIES: THE ROLE OF WELL-FUNCTIONING ECONOMIC STRUCTURES | 5 
 
Heritage and Fraser institutes). Moreover, we include expenditure in terms of Active Labour 
Market Policies and net replacement rates to broaden the set of actual labour market policies. 
Active labour market policies and net replacement rates are not economic, institutional 
structures alone, but more expressions of a social safety net. This notwithstanding, the two 
variables are looked at in the regressions as a benchmark for the model approach, as we would 
assume to see less strong output declines where a country has strong (automatic) stabilisers. 
Furthermore, the quality of the education is measured by the share of the population in higher 
education. 
Excessive product market regulation also affects the shock absorption capacity of economies. In 
order for the economy to weather shocks, it must be possible for prices to adjust quickly and for 
production factors to be reallocated between firms and sectors. Price adjustments are essential 
to ensure a pass- through of changes in labour costs to consumer prices. In the event of a decline 
in labour costs after a negative shock, the competitiveness of an economy can only improve if 
prices also adjust. Without swift price adjustment, the cost of an adverse shock would fall on 
the real disposable income of households. Sector-specific policies include, for example, 
competition policies for network industries (e.g. energy, telecoms or transport), the retail sector 
and closed professions (e.g. notaries, pharmacies or lawyers). 
Framework conditions are tightly linked to product markets. They capture policies that can 
create favourable broader business conditions to facilitate the entry of new firms and alleviate 
the administrative burden of existing firms. Moreover, we interpret framework conditions as 
also covering the quality of government services, or more broadly the interaction of the 
government with the economy as a whole (as for example expressed in the rule of law, the level 
of corruptions or the governments’ effectiveness). While some indicators used are more linked 
to competition in product markets (e.g. the OECD Product Market Regulation indicators or the 
Global Competitiveness Institute index for goods market efficiency) other variables are mainly 
covering framework conditions (e.g. the World Governance or Fraser Economic Freedom 
Indicators). A third group of indicators (such as the Doing Business Indicators or the headline 
Global Competitiveness Index) captures both product market competition and framework 
conditions more broadly. 
3. Operationalising resilient economic structures 
Economic resilience is measured in two alternative ways in this paper. Section 3.1 defines 
resilience as output reaction to common shocks. Naturally also other macro variables (e.g. 
unemployment) or more micro-based data could be studied. For this empirical exercise, 
however, GDP serves as a well-measurable and intuitive summary indicator for how shocks 
affect the overall economy. Section 3.2, in turn, abstracts from the origin of the shock and simply 
looks at large crisis episodes across OECD countries to understand whether well-functioning 
economic structures can reduce the likelihood of such events occurring. 
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3.1 The reaction to common shocks: what role for institutions? 
3.1.1 Empirical approach: identifying common shocks 
Empirically, we gauge the resilience as the estimated correlations between a country’s output 
change and a common shock, while conditioning on the strength of the country’s institution. A 
small number implies a low correlation between common shocks and the respective country-
specific economic growth in the given period. In line with the literature, common shocks are 
chosen to allow a comparison of output reaction depending on different institutional set-ups 
among countries. This study will focus on unobserved shocks applying two different concepts.  
First, in the spirit of Canova et al. (2011), we extract common shocks through a structural model 
using aggregate euro area data, as we assume that they largely capture all common disturbances 
that affect EU countries. One way to establish comparable shocks from aggregate data is to 
consider euro area aggregate GDP shocks. We employ a VAR approach to extract such shocks 
from other common shocks. Annual aggregate euro area data covering the period 1986 to 2014 
include GDP at constant prices, HICP or CPI as price proxies, a short-term interest rate variable 
(three-month Euribor) and M3. The VAR was estimated in levels,2 with the number of lags 
determined by the Akaike and BIC criterion. The four-variable VAR takes the form: 
(1) ܺ௧ = ܣ(ܮ)ܺ௧ି௜ + ݁௧ , where 
ܺ௧ = ൦ݕ௧݌௧ݎ௧
݉௧
൪ and ݁௧ = ൦݁௬௧݁௣௧݁௥௧
݁௠௧
൪ 
The residuals are obtained using Choleski decomposition. Having GDP (ݕ௧ with t being the time 
index) first implies that the un-forecastable part of GDP is due to only pure GDP shocks. For 
prices (݌௧) the un-forecastable part is due to GDP and price shocks only, and so on. For money 
(݉௧)  the interpretation of a money demand-type relationship is consistent with ranking money 
last. The standardised series ݁௬௧ from the VAR specification is then used as the common 
(unobserved) shock. 
As a second, alternative approach to proxy common shocks, we make use of common patterns 
across time in country-specific output series, in the spirit of Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). Here 
a panel model, including all OECD countries for the period 1990 to 2014, is estimated with the 
simple form 
(2) ݕ௜௧ =  ߙ + ߚ௜ܦ௜ + ߛ௧ܦ௧ + ݁௜௧ 
where ݕ௜௧ is the country-specific output growth, ܦ௜  are country and ܦ௧  time dummies. The 
coefficient of the time dummies capture common reactions across countries, assuming that 
                                                             
2 Note that for the purpose of extracting VAR shocks a model, the stationarity properties of the variables 
are not relevant since the estimates of VAR coefficients will be consistent even when unit roots are 
present (see Canova, 2007). 
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idiosyncratic disturbances are captured by the country-specific variables. This standardised 
variable from the panel approach is then used as an alternative way to proxy common shocks.   
Figure 1. Common unobserved GDP shocks 
 
Note: Both shocks are standardised, with zero mean and unit standard deviation. 
Sources: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat, European Commission and ECB data. 
Figure 1 compares both common shocks, indicating a very similar behaviour, which is confirmed 
by the results (as shown in section 3.1.3) which are broadly robust when subjected to either of 
the two approaches. Overall, looking at the figure, the structural approach depicts a little less 
variation around the zero mean, probably due, in most part, to the exclusion of other than pure 
GDP shocks.  
3.1.2 Measuring the importance of well-functioning economic structures   
The role of economic structures for greater economic resilience is measured by interacting 
common shocks with various proxies for labour and product market characteristics, as well 
framework conditions. A fixed effects panel model of the following form is employed: 
(3) ݕ௜௧ =  ߙ + ߚ ௧ܵ + ߛܺ௜௧ + ߜ ௧ܵܺ௜௧ + ܦ௜ + ݁௜௧ 
In equation (3) the country-specific (i) and time-varying (t) real GDP growth series (ݕ௜௧) are 
regressed on the common shock ( ௧ܵ), the respective structural variable (ܺ௜௧) and their 
interaction term ( ௧ܵܺ௜௧), as well as country fixed effects (ܦ௜). For the purpose of this exercise, 
we are particularly interested in the marginal effect of an institutional specification in the case 
of a common shock, expressed by ߜ. However, the total effect will then be captured by also 
looking at shock coefficient (ߚ) itself:  
(4) ߠ = ߚ ௧ܵ + ߜ ௧ܵܺ௜௧. 
By looking at equation (4) we will be able to compare e.g. how differently flexible labour markets 
across countries impact the shock absorption capacity of an economy in the case of a common 
shock. We would expect to see a negative coefficient ߜ for institutional variables, assuming that 
-4
-2
0
2
4
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Panel GDP Shock VAR GDP Shock
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a higher value of the variable indicates more flexible institutions. In this case, a country would 
be less affected by common shocks, i.e. be more resilient, if institutions are less rigid. 
As noted above, this study focuses on common and abstracts from country-specific shocks. For 
completeness, however, it is important to note that even if countries do not react significantly 
to common shocks, i.e. they are seen as more resilient, they are still susceptible to their own 
country-specific shocks.   
3.1.3 Data and empirical results 
We employ various measures for labour market as well as product market policies and 
framework conditions, as defined in more detail in section 2. The dataset spans all OECD 
countries3 from 1990 to 2014. Data availability varies across structural variables, however.  
Overall, regression results confirm the ability of strong economic structures to cushion the effect 
of common shocks on economic growth. Table 1 (VAR approach to extract shocks) and Table 2 
(Panel approach to extract shocks) cover individual regression results for a set of labour market, 
product market and framework condition variables. Indicators of labour market flexibility (i.e. 
OECD EPL, Heritage or GCI flexibility indicator) exhibit significant coefficients, with signs being in 
line with expectations. Take, for example, the GCI (or Heritage) labour market flexibility 
indicator: the negative coefficient indicates that the higher the value for this index, i.e. the more 
flexible a labour market, and the smaller the output loss in the face of a common GDP shock.  
                                                             
3 Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria have been dropped due to too many gaps across institutional variables. 
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Table 1. The role of economic structures for common shocks (VAR method) 
 
The sign for the OECD EPL index is also in line with expectations as the index is scaled conversely, 
where a lower value indicates higher flexibility and thereby a positive coefficient suggests that 
the more flexible labour market institutions are the smaller is the country-specific output loss in 
the presence of a negative global shock. However, does this mean that zero regulation, e.g. on 
labour markets, is optimal for resilience? Our results should not be misinterpreted in this way, 
for two reasons. First, many of the institutional variables are not confined to the regulatory 
perspective, but are more broadly a measure of efficiency or well-functioning. For example, the 
Global Competitiveness sub-index on labour and product markets go beyond flexibility 
considerations by including factors related to the education or the demand conditions more 
broadly. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
shock 1.313*** 1.208*** 1.107*** 1.237*** 1.195*** 1.309*** 1.229*** 1.192*** 0.301** 1.245*** 1.221***
(0.116) (0.104) (0.097) (0.109) (0.097) (0.108) (0.113) (0.111) (0.124) (0.108) (0.102)
Labour market institutions
ALMP*shock -0.139*
(0.077)
NRR*shock -0.192*
(0.102)
OECD EPL*shock 0.151*
(0.088)
GCI LM efficiency*shock -0.149*
(0.077)
Heritage LM efficiency*shock -0.226**
(0.098)
HighEdu*shock -0.232**
(0.086)
Product market institutions &
 framework conditions
GCI PM efficiency*shock -0.057
(0.101)
Economic Freedom*shock -0.067
(0.195)
Doing Business*shock -0.151*
(0.078)
WGI*shock -0.191*
(0.111)
GCI*shock -0.086
(0.095)
Constant 2.333*** 2.037*** 2.379*** 1.440*** 1.741*** 2.329*** 1.429*** 2.577*** 1.491*** 2.413*** 1.438***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.008) (0.035) (0.065) (0.041) (0.005)
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
r2 0.265 0.252 0.188 0.316 0.283 0.358 0.355 0.228 0.097 0.270 0.402
N 458 418 664 315 350 527 315 490 173 525 315
Note: * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Table suppresses regression results of institutional variables, see Tables in Annex C for details. ALMP: Active Labour Market Policy 
Expenditure; NRR: Net replacement rate (unemployment benefits compared to last salary); EPL: OECD Employment Protection 
Legislation index; GCI LM: Labour market efficiency indicator of the Global Comeptitivness Institute; Hertigage LM efficiency: Labour 
Market efficiency indicator of the Heritage Economic Freedom index; HighEdu: percent of population with tertiary education; GCI: 
Overall competitivness indicator of the Global Competitiveness Institute; Economic Freedom: Economic Freedom Indicator of the Fraser 
institute; Doing Business: Overall World Bank Doing Business indicator; WGI: World Bank Governance Indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, Eurostat, ECB, OECD, World Bank, Global Competitiveness Institute, 
Heritage foundation, Fraser Institute data.
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Table 2. The role of economic structures for common shocks (Panel method) 
 
However, of course two variables focus on regulation, i.e. the Heritage and OECD EPL index. Yet, 
those should be seen in conjunction with other variables looked at, such as active labour market 
policies (ALMP), which provide a sense that in a ‘flexicurity’ concept, higher flexibility should be 
accompanied by higher security. In this vein, also the other variables parameter yields the 
presumed results. For education, for example, we would indeed have expected that an economy 
with more educated people seems to be less affected by shocks. Expenditures for active labour 
market policies and net replacement rates have the expected (automatic) stabilisation function. 
The more a country spends the lower the contemporaneous effect of a shock.  
Product market competition indicators and variables measuring framework conditions are 
likewise significant (although varying a bit more depending on the shock definition applied). For 
all variables used in this category a higher value implies more flexible institutions, competition 
and business- friendly conditions. The negative sign in turn implies less contraction in the face 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
shock 2.042*** 2.068*** 1.671*** 2.096*** 2.069*** 2.039*** 2.057*** 2.059*** 2.144*** 2.024*** 1.963***
(0.216) (0.198) (0.140) (0.212) (0.200) (0.184) (0.208) (0.186) (0.338) (0.195) (0.177)
Labour market institutions
ALMP*shock 0.229
(0.213)
NRR*shock -0.415**
(0.197)
OECD EPL*shock 0.086
(0.126)
GCI LM efficiency*shock -0.139
(0.126)
Heritage LM efficiency*shock -0.422**
(0.161)
HighEdu*shock -0.229*
(0.118)
Product market institutions &
 framework conditions
GCI PM efficiency*shock -0.370*
(0.196)
Economic Freedom*shock -0.496*
(0.245)
Doing Business*shock -0.709**
(0.348)
WGI*shock -0.348*
(0.174)
GCI*shock -0.426**
(0.176)
Constant 2.074*** 2.239*** 2.286*** 2.339*** 2.351*** 2.270*** 2.363*** 2.310*** 2.344*** 2.265*** 2.305***
(0.015) (0.035) (0.007) (0.091) (0.065) (0.029) (0.098) (0.020) (0.122) (0.024) (0.078)
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
r2 0.569 0.577 0.402 0.575 0.596 0.546 0.592 0.537 0.207 0.567 0.620
N 458 418 664 315 350 527 315 490 173 525 315
Note: * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Table suppresses regression results of institutional variables, see Tables in Annex C for details. ALMP: Active Labour Market Policy 
Expenditure; NRR: Net replacement rate (unemployment benefits compared to last salary); EPL: OECD Employment Protection Legislation 
index; GCI LM: Labour market efficiency indicator of the Global Comeptitivness Institute; Hertigage LM efficiency: Labour Market 
efficiency indicator of the Heritage Economic Freedom index; HighEdu: percent of population with tertiary education; GCI: Overall 
competitivness indicator of the Global Competitiveness Institute; Economic Freedom: Economic Freedom Indicator of the Fraser institute; 
Doing Business: Overall World Bank Doing Business indicator; WGI: World Bank Governance Indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, Eurostat, ECB, OECD, World Bank, Global Competitiveness Institute, 
Heritage foundation, Fraser Institute data.
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of a shock where there are strong institutional characteristics. The OECD PMR indicator proved 
to be insignificant. 
The tendency for policy settings in different domains to be highly correlated (e.g. countries with 
rigid labour markets often also display limited competition in product markets) generates 
multicollinearity and therefore prevents the estimation of equations with the full set of policies 
and institutions (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2007). However, by not including them jointly in one 
regression, it would be sensible to think of the estimates as upper-bound values, as other 
correlated variables are not included in the regressions, resulting in an upward bias. On a 
different note, the intercept of all regressions exhibits a coefficient in line with expectations.4 
Table 3. Implied impact of shock with differently sound economic structures  
(a) VAR shock                                                           (b) Panel Shock 
 
As this study is mainly interested in the impact of institutions in the presence of common shocks, 
i.e. the resilience of an economy, neither table includes the regression results for the effect of 
institutional characteristics for growth prospects (although they are reported for completeness 
in Annex C). Studies focusing on the impact of institutional quality on growth have to look at 
longer-term changes of output to be able to identify the role for institutions. For example, 
Masuch et al., 2016, look at 15-year averages of GDP per capita growth rates and also adjust for 
the starting value for each country. While the results of the institutional estimates (as presented 
                                                             
4 Given that both shocks and institutions have been standardised, i.e. exhibit zero mean and unit standard 
deviation, the intercept roughly depicts average GDP growth in the case of no particular common shock 
and average institutions. Across all specifications the intercept is with an average of 2.1 close to the overall 
real GDP growth rate across euro area countries (2.3%). 
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Labour market institutions Labour market institutions
ALMP*shock -0.48 -1.46 ALMP*shock -1.81 -3.41
NRR*shock -0.72 -1.46 NRR*shock -1.01 -2.61
OECD EPL*shock -0.74 -1.61 OECD EPL*shock -1.46 -1.96
GCI LM efficiency*shock -0.88 -1.53 GCI LM efficiency*shock -1.77 -2.36
Heritage LM efficiency*shock -0.70 -1.66 Heritage LM efficiency*shock -1.14 -2.94
HighEdu*shock -0.66 -1.87 HighEdu*shock -1.40 -2.59
Product market institutions & Product market institutions &
 framework conditions  framework conditions
GCI PM efficiency*shock -1.12 -1.36 GCI PM efficiency*shock -1.37 -2.90
Economic Freedom*shock -1.05 -1.59 Economic Freedom*shock -0.99 -4.98
Doing Business*shock 0.01 -0.63 Doing Business*shock -0.67 -3.66
WGI*shock -0.95 -1.82 WGI*shock -1.48 -3.07
GCI*shock -1.05 -1.41 GCI*shock -1.14 -2.88
Implied range of 
effect of shock
Implied range of 
effect of shock
Notes: The range is estimated by taking equation (4), assuming a one SD negative common shock, and taking the 
minimum and maximum institutional value across countries. Gray and italic range imply not significant interaction 
coefficients. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, Eurostat, ECB, OECD, World Bank, Global 
Competitiveness Institute, Heritage foundation, Fraser Institute data.
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in Annex C) point in the expected direction for most variables, they should be treated with 
caution, as the chosen approach is not made to explain differences in long-term economic 
growth. 
When looking at longer-time averages of output, an issue of endogeneity could arise as higher 
growth could also create a better environment for reforms towards higher quality institutions 
(Hall and Jones, 1999, and Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). First, as we only look at GDP growth 
in one year and second as the institutional variables are very slow moving, this possible issue is 
not likely to bias our results. We nevertheless control for the possibility of endogeneity by 
estimating the same regression with lagged explanatory institutional variables. Results are 
robust to this change. 
For the same shock, weaker institutions can on average imply up to twice as high an output loss 
in a given year compared to a country with frontier institutional characteristics. Table 3 shows 
the effect of a given shock for the lowest and highest value of the respective institution. The way 
to read this table is the following: take three countries with the highest, the average and the 
lowest value for GCI labour market flexibility. Now assume a common (one standard deviation) 
shock that reduces output by about one percentage point for the country with average labour 
market flexibility. In Table 3 (a), the country with the highest labour market rigidities will 
experience a -1.53 percentage point reduction in contemporaneous output, while the country 
with the most resilient labour market will only see GDP deteriorate by -0.88 percentage points.  
We also applied various additional robustness checks for the shock identification process. First, 
as an alternative to capturing common GDP shocks via the two methods above, we derive the 
common patterns of country-specific output series by means of Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA). This approach is conceptionally similar to the panel approach described above. Results 
using a PCA based shock identification are very robust (see Annex A).  
Another means of robustness check is to think of external shocks that apply to countries in a 
similar fashion. As a proxy for this event, we take world GDP (controlling for the countries’ own 
share in it). Again, results presented in Table 1 and Table 2 (in section 3.1.3) are overall robust 
to these changes (Annex B). 
3.2 Do well-functioning economic structures reduce the probability of crises? 
Another way of operationalising resilience is to abstract from the origin of the crisis (e.g. 
common or country-specific shocks), but to look at extreme GDP events in general and aim to 
establish the role for strong economic structures to reduce such instances. We take the 
distribution of GDP growth across all OECD countries from 1990 to 2014 (see Figure 2) and define 
the 10th percentile of the distribution as crisis events, which includes median GDP growth of -4%. 
We estimate a probit regression model of the following form 
(5) Pr(ݕ = 1|ݔ) = ߆(ߚ௧ܺ௜௧) 
where ࢨ indicates the cumulative standard normal probability distribution function, ߚ is a Kx1 
vector of parameters, x is a NxK matrix of explanatory variables. The independent variable has 
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been defined above. The exogenous variables are again the different measures of institutional 
quality and a set of control variables, i.e. total government expenditure and nominal short-term 
interest rates.  
Figure 2. OECD countries’ GDP growth distribution (1990-2014) 
 
Source: Author’s calculation based on European Commission data. 
The findings confirm the results derived in section 3.1: more efficient economic structures make 
a country more resilient to crisis events. Table 4 presents the results of the probit model at 
margins of the respective weakest and strongest institutional outcome. In a nutshell, the results 
show that the probability of a severe reduction in GDP will be significantly lower (on average 
estimates suggest by 20%) if a country has the most efficient compared to a country with the 
least efficient economic structures.  
Both labour and product market indicators are overall significant, and therefore attach 
considerable weight to the flexible characteristics of an economy in terms of increasing its 
resilience. The estimate for the Fraser institute Economic Freedom indicator is particularly 
noteworthy, given its deviation in terms of magnitude from the other results. While most labour 
and product market (or framework conditions) indicators suggest a crisis probability somewhat 
above 20% for the country with the most rigid economic structures, the country with the 
weakest Economic Freedom indicator are even set to have a probability of 70%. This significant 
outlier could be explained by the specifically broad coverage of this indicator. It includes 
indicators of basic government quality (e.g. property rights, legal system), the efficiency of 
labour and product markets, trade and investment barriers and financial openness. Being at the 
bottom of the league in all these indicators indeed reflects a particularly concerning situation 
for the economy at large, which is not apparent when only focusing e.g. on the employment 
protection legislation indicator.   
As in the previous section, the possibility of endogeneity is controlled for by lagging the 
explanatory institutional variables. Results are robust to this change. 
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Moreover, the Economic Freedom index reflects the importance of the enforceability of 
contracts and property rights, which appears very important in decreasing the likelihood of 
being affected by a major crisis. Looking at the distribution of countries for this indicator, it 
appears to be particularly weak in some of the Baltic countries, Greece and in some low income 
OECD countries. The result in Table 4 therefore appears consistent with that of Acemoglu (2003) 
as cited in section 2. 
Table 4. Strength of economic structures reduces probability of crisis  
 
4. Policy implications: a process for more resilient economies 
The variables measuring the quality of economic structures identified above can be used to 
monitor country-specific progress towards more resilient structures comparing countries to 
their peers.  
Probability of GDP slump
strongest weakest
institution institution
Labour market institutions
OECD EPL 8% 13%
(0.03) *** (0.05) ***
GCI LM efficiency 7% 20%
(0.03) ** (0.05) ***
Heritage LM efficiency 5% 21%
(0.02) ** (0.06) ***
HighEdu 5% 14%
(0.02) ** (0.05) ***
Product market institutions &
 framework conditions
GCI PM efficiency 6% 26%
(0.03) ** (0.07) ***
Economic Freedom 3% 70%
(0.02) ** (0.2) ***
Doing Business 0.01 21%
(0.01) (0.09) **
WGI 6% 19%
(0.02) *** (0.07) ***
GCI 5% 27%
(0.02) ** (0.07) ***
Note: * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in 
brackets. For variables definition, see Table 1 and 2. The table 
depicts the results of a probit model (see text for detailed 
equation), in which the probability of crisis is depicted 
depending of differently strong institutions (while the control 
variables are assumed to be average)
Source: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, 
Eurostat, OECD, World Bank, Global Competitiveness Institute, 
Heritage foundation, Fraser Institute data.
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The need for such a monitoring process has just been identified, in particular for the euro area 
countries. In the current debate on strengthening the governance framework of the euro area, 
such a call has been made in the Five Presidents’ Report (Juncker et al., 2015), which suggests 
initialising a “convergence process towards more resilient economic structures”. 
The empirical results derived in section 3 suggest that the applied indicators serve as a good 
proxy for the good functioning of national markets. Nevertheless, it is important to recall that 
most of them face possible measurement issues. First, and more generally, certain economic 
structures (such as those pertaining to labour and product markets) are multifaceted and often 
not easily or not at all quantifiable. Second, given that indicators are often based on perceptions, 
they might be affected by cyclical influences, e.g. at times of crisis perceptions about the working 
of certain institutions could be worse than in good times. And third, the sample size and 
composition of the survey matters as well as its changes through time. 
In light of these caveats, it seems appropriate to reconcile these variables with objective 
measurable outcome variables. Thus, we suggest a simplistic empirical model to identify 
observable macro-economic variables able to provide a good cross-check for the qualitative 
institutional indicators. These two types of variables could then serve for the creation of a policy 
scoreboard which measures distance to frontier for euro area or OECD countries more generally.  
For the identification of quantitative macro data which can be empirically associated to the 
qualitative institutional indicators, we employ simple panel regressions of the following form 
(6) ݕ௜௧ =  ߙ + ߚ௜ܦ௜ + ߛ௧ܦ௧ + ߜܺ௜௧ + ݁௜௧. 
Equation (6) suggests that we assume that certain macro variables (ݕ௜௧) exist that can be partially 
explained by the structural variable (ܺ௜௧), which we identified in previous sections. Moreover, 
each panel regression includes country (ܦ௜) and time (ܦ௧) fixed effects that should broadly 
capture other factors determining the macro variables in addition to the policy or structural 
variables. Given that this exercise is not the focus of the paper the regressions are conducted in 
a relatively simplistic fashion, without conducting a battery of robustness checks. Against this 
background, the empirical results in Table 5 should be viewed with caution and not be regarded 
as more than providing a rough link between the two types of indicators.  
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Table 5. Identifying macro variables to cross check institutional proxies  
 
Table 5 shows that there is a tendency that with higher employment protection legislation, or 
lower flexibility of labour market institutions at large, labour cost tends to rise. The more difficult 
it becomes to shift labour across firms, sectors, and time (e.g. to renegotiate wages in difficult 
economic times), the more downward wage rigidity exist, in turn, leading (all else equal) to 
higher labour cost. As seen in many peripheral countries during the euro area sovereign debt 
crisis, these rigidities tended in fact to cause some upward pressure on unit labour costs, in 
particular on the non-tradable sectors, which are less exposed to international competition. Also 
the unemployment rate, in particular of low-skilled workers, reacts strongly to rigidities in labour 
markets, which often benefit incumbent workers, at the expense of the (often lower-skilled) 
unemployed.  
For the quality of educational attainments, in particular of the tertiary sector (which was the 
focus of this study), the participation rate seems a reasonable fit. While this observable variable 
is clearly determined by many factors, the quality of the education system is a particularly 
important driver as it increases the employability of workers more generally.  
For product market competition, the entry of new firms is an essential criterion. The birth rate 
of new firms is a good indicator variable in this respect, as confirmed by the significant 
coefficient in the regression. More conducive overall framework conditions should also lead to 
a better climate for innovation and productivity. The Total Factor Productivity growth appears 
as a good proxy for this in this regard. Moreover, firms’ investment inclination, everything else 
being equal, should also increase if the business environment is more favourable.  
The results of the previous sections, together with the empirical results, suggest that related 
observable macro data could be used by policymakers to set up a policy scoreboard that would 
establish an overall picture of resilience of the respective countries across all different structural 
variables, as well as their distance from best practices. Such scoreboards could facilitate the 
monitoring of policy progress by looking at qualitative institutional variables in the first place, 
but cross-checked by assessing developments of observable macro-economic variables.   
category Institutional proxy related macro variable for cross-check
[independent variable]  [dependent variable]
Labour market efficiency EPL 0.329** Unit labour costs
Heritage /GCI sub-indices -0.152** Unit labour costs, non-tradable sectors
0.099** Employment rate
-0.174** Unemployment rate, lowskilled workers
Educational attainment Tertiary education 0.062* Participation rate
Goods/services market efficiency DoingBusiness/GCI 0.901* Investment growth
0.392** Birth rate of new firms
Framework costs WGI 0.831** TFP growth
Economic Freedom 0.270** Birth rate of new firms
Notes: Relating institutional variables to macro variables is done by means of separate panel estimations regressing the change 
of macro variables on change of instiutional proxies with country and time fixed effects. All variables are standardised. Stars 
indicate significance at * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Source: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, Eurostat, ECB, OECD, World Bank, Global Competitiveness Institute, 
Heritage foundation, Fraser Institute data.
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5. Conclusions 
The financial and sovereign debt crisis has exposed the limited economic resilience of several 
OECD and most euro area economies. Limited economic resilience is often related to weak 
national economic structures.5 In particular, rigidities in labour markets, limited competition in 
product markets, framework conditions that impede the entry of new firms and complicate the 
daily business of existing firms, and the quality of government services (e.g. rule of law, absence 
of corruption) are often considered to be the main obstacles to a higher shock absorption 
capacity.  
This paper contributes to the literature by establishing a range of empirical measures of 
resilience. First, we isolate common GDP shocks across countries, using VAR and panel models. 
Second, we abstract from the origin of the shock and just filter severe crisis events by selecting 
the 10th percentile of the GDP distribution of a sample of OECD countries over 35 years. We then 
estimate whether the reaction to shocks and the likelihood of entering severe recession depends 
on the quality of national economic structures that are measured by a wide set of institutional 
indicators capturing the abovementioned dimensions. Furthermore, we take the evidence 
gathered on structural variables and link them to observable macro variables. We suggest that 
such a combination of structural and macro variables could serve as basis for a policy scoreboard 
to monitor progress towards higher resilience in countries.  
Overall, we find robust evidence that strong and flexible institutions increase resilience to 
adverse shocks. For a common shock across countries, a country with weaker economic 
structures can, on average, suffer up to twice the output loss in a given year compared to a 
country with best-practice institutional parameters. Similarly, other empirical results show that 
the likelihood of a severe economic crisis is significantly reduced if a country exhibits flexible and 
adaptable institutions.  
The identified structural variables are then related to observable macro data. We find 
reasonable macro data that could enhance and double-check the reading of the institutional 
data. While this exercise is simplistic and exemplary in terms of macro variables’ coverage, 
overall it shows how the monitoring process towards similarly resilient structures could be set 
up, as suggested in the ‘Five Presidents’ Report’ (Juncker et al 2015), for example.  
This work could be enhanced in various ways. A more granular analysis of an economy’s capacity 
to withstand shocks based on the strength of its institutions could be envisaged. This could take 
many routes; for example, it could further break down labour market policy indicators to see 
which (combination of) policies most help to increase resilience. Alternatively, a sectoral analysis 
could be used to establish which more sectoral institutional indicators have the predictive power 
of more resilient sector performances across euro area countries.   
                                                             
5 See Juncker et al. (2015), who call for a “convergence process towards more resilient economic 
structures” in the Five Presidents’ Report, not least as a precondition for a euro area fiscal stabilisation 
function. See also Draghi (2015). 
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Annex A 
Table 6. The role of economic structures for common shocks (PCA method) 
 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
shock 2.073*** 2.113*** 1.741*** 2.112*** 2.101*** 2.000*** 2.065*** 2.056*** 1.733*** 2.005*** 1.980***
(0.205) (0.198) (0.139) (0.209) (0.199) (0.162) (0.204) (0.179) (0.310) (0.188) (0.175)
Labour market institutions
ALMP*shock 0.238
(0.223)
NRR*shock -0.412**
(0.196)
OECD EPL*shock 0.104
(0.125)
GCI LM flexibility*shock -0.159
(0.126)
Heritage LM flexibility*shock -0.431**
(0.162)
HighEdu*shock -0.174
(0.107)
Product market institutions &
 framework conditions
GCI PM efficiency*shock -0.356*
(0.194)
Economic Freedom*shock -0.462*
(0.232)
Doing Business*shock -0.594**
(0.287)
WGI*shock -0.318*
(0.165)
GCI*shock -0.413**
(0.173)
Constant 2.152*** 2.488*** 2.290*** 2.502*** 2.543*** 2.417*** 2.516*** 2.486*** 2.301*** 2.441*** 2.458***
(0.006) (0.057) (0.007) (0.105) (0.081) (0.031) (0.109) (0.015) (0.130) (0.027) (0.090)
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
r2 0.585 0.573 0.421 0.572 0.594 0.535 0.588 0.533 0.204 0.560 0.619
N 458 418 664 315 350 527 315 490 173 525 315
Note: * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Table suppresses regression results of institutional variables, as not the focus of this analysis. ALMP: Active Labour Market Policy 
Expenditure; NRR: Net replacement rate (unemployment benefits compared to last salary); EPL: OECD Employment Protection Legislation 
index; GCI LM: Labour market flexibility indicator of the Global Comeptitivness Institute; Hertigage LM flexibility: Labour Market flexibility 
indicator of the Heritage Economic Freedom index; HighEdu: percent of population with tertiary education; GCI: Overall competitivness 
indicator of the Global Competitiveness Institute; Economic Freedom: Economic Freedom Indicator of the Fraser institute; Doing Business: 
Overall World Bank Doing Business indicator; WGI: World Bank Governance Indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, Eurostat, ECB, OECD, World Bank, Global Competitiveness Institute, 
Heritage foundation, Fraser Institute data.
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Annex B 
Table 7. The role of economic structures for common shocks (World GDP method) 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
shock 1.749*** 1.897*** 1.389*** 2.147*** 2.186*** 1.749*** 2.080*** 1.843*** 0.725** 1.753*** 2.030***
(0.267) (0.229) (0.172) (0.226) (0.218) (0.219) (0.225) (0.205) (0.343) (0.195) (0.201)
Labour market institutions
ALMP*shock 0.048
(0.161)
NRR*shock -0.293
(0.221)
OECD EPL*shock 0.263*
(0.129)
GCI LM flexibility*shock -0.232*
(0.124)
Heritage LM flexibility*shock -0.519***
(0.172)
HighEdu*shock -0.041
(0.159)
Product market institutions &
 framework conditions
GCI PM efficiency*shock -0.301
(0.227)
Economic Freedom*shock -0.147
(0.263)
Doing Business*shock -0.047
(0.333)
WGI*shock -0.186
(0.162)
GCI*shock -0.356*
(0.205)
Constant 2.211*** 1.869*** 2.238*** 1.483*** 1.600*** 2.236*** 1.482*** 2.240*** 1.541*** 2.191*** 1.471***
(0.004) (0.007) (0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.028) (0.070) (0.034) (0.014)
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
r2 0.337 0.411 0.259 0.504 0.525 0.434 0.524 0.358 0.077 0.392 0.561
N 458 418 664 315 350 527 315 490 173 525 315
Note: * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in brackets.
Table suppresses regression results of institutional variables, as not the focus of this analysis. ALMP: Active Labour Market Policy 
Expenditure; NRR: Net replacement rate (unemployment benefits compared to last salary); EPL: OECD Employment Protection Legislation 
index; GCI LM: Labour market flexibility indicator of the Global Comeptitivness Institute; Hertigage LM flexibility: Labour Market flexibility 
indicator of the Heritage Economic Freedom index; HighEdu: percent of population with tertiary education; GCI: Overall competitivness 
indicator of the Global Competitiveness Institute; Economic Freedom: Economic Freedom Indicator of the Fraser institute; Doing Business: 
Overall World Bank Doing Business indicator; WGI: World Bank Governance Indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, Eurostat, ECB, OECD, World Bank, Global Competitiveness Institute, 
Heritage foundation, Fraser Institute data.
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Annex C 
Table 8. The role of economic structures for output growth (VAR approach) 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
shock 1.313*** 1.208*** 1.107*** 1.237*** 1.195*** 1.309*** 1.229*** 1.192*** 0.301** 1.245*** 1.221***
(0.116) (0.104) (0.097) (0.109) (0.097) (0.108) (0.113) (0.111) (0.124) (0.108) (0.102)
Labour market institutions
ALMP -0.688
(0.413)
ALMP*shock -0.139*
(0.077)
NRR -0.044
(0.422)
NRR*shock -0.192*
(0.102)
OECD EPL 1.181
(1.145)
OECD EPL*shock 0.151*
(0.088)
GCI LM efficiency -0.844*
(0.445)
GCI LM efficiency*shock -0.149*
(0.077)
Heritage LM efficiency 1.015
(0.809)
Heritage LM efficiency*shock -0.226**
(0.098)
HighEdu -2.170***
(0.258)
HighEdu*shock -0.232**
(0.086)
Product market institutions &
 framework conditions
GCI PM efficiency  2.150***
(0.556)
GCI PM efficiency*shock -0.057
(0.101)
Economic Freedom 0.727*
(0.425)
Economic Freedom*shock -0.067
(0.195)
Doing Business -0.328
(0.822)
Doing Business*shock -0.151*
(0.078)
WGI  -0.954*
(0.554)
WGI*shock -0.191*
(0.111)
GCI -0.980***
(0.288)
GCI*shock -0.086
(0.095)
Constant 2.333*** 2.037*** 2.379*** 1.440*** 1.741*** 2.329*** 1.429*** 2.577*** 1.491*** 2.413*** 1.438***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.006) (0.016) (0.004) (0.008) (0.035) (0.065) (0.041) (0.005)
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
r2 0.265 0.252 0.188 0.316 0.283 0.358 0.355 0.228 0.097 0.270 0.402
N 458 418 664 315 350 527 315 490 173 525 315
Note: * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in brackets.
ALMP: Active Labour Market Policy Expenditure; NRR: Net replacement rate (unemployment benefits compared to last salary); EPL: 
OECD Employment Protection Legislation index; GCI LM: Labour market efficiency indicator of the Global Comeptitivness Institute; 
Hertigage LM efficiency: Labour Market efficiency indicator of the Heritage Economic Freedom index; HighEdu: percent of population 
with tertiary education; GCI: Overall competitivness indicator of the Global Competitiveness Institute; Economic Freedom: Economic 
Freedom Indicator of the Fraser institute; Doing Business: Overall World Bank Doing Business indicator; WGI: World Bank Governance 
Indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, Eurostat, ECB, OECD, World Bank, Global Competitiveness Institute, 
Heritage foundation, Fraser Institute data.
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Table 9. The role of economic structures for output growth (Panel approach) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
shock 2.042*** 2.068*** 1.671*** 2.096*** 2.069*** 2.039*** 2.057*** 2.059*** 2.144*** 2.024*** 1.963***
(0.216) (0.198) (0.140) (0.212) (0.200) (0.184) (0.208) (0.186) (0.338) (0.195) (0.177)
Labour market institutions
ALMP -0.407
(0.273)
ALMP*shock 0.229
(0.213)
NRR -0.605*
(0.331)
NRR*shock -0.415**
(0.197)
OECD EPL 0.971
(0.999)
OECD EPL*shock 0.086
(0.126)
GCI LM efficiency 0.228
(0.360)
GCI LM efficiency*shock -0.139
(0.126)
Heritage LM efficiency 0.080
(0.540)
Heritage LM efficiency*shock -0.422**
(0.161)
HighEdu -0.434*
(0.217)
HighEdu*shock -0.229*
(0.118)
Product market institutions &
 framework conditions
GCI PM efficiency  0.512
(0.454)
GCI PM efficiency*shock -0.370*
(0.196)
Economic Freedom 0.934**
(0.347)
Economic Freedom*shock -0.496*
(0.245)
Doing Business -0.202
(0.817)
Doing Business*shock -0.709**
(0.348)
WGI  2.631***
(0.790)
WGI*shock -0.348*
(0.174)
GCI 2.611**
(1.046)
GCI*shock -0.426**
(0.176)
Constant 2.074*** 2.239*** 2.286*** 2.339*** 2.351*** 2.270*** 2.363*** 2.310*** 2.344*** 2.265*** 2.305***
(0.015) (0.035) (0.007) (0.091) (0.065) (0.029) (0.098) (0.020) (0.122) (0.024) (0.078)
County fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
r2 0.569 0.577 0.402 0.575 0.596 0.546 0.592 0.537 0.207 0.567 0.620
N 458 418 664 315 350 527 315 490 173 525 315
Note: * p<0.1  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in brackets.
ALMP: Active Labour Market Policy Expenditure; NRR: Net replacement rate (unemployment benefits compared to last salary); EPL: OECD 
Employment Protection Legislation index; GCI LM: Labour market efficiency indicator of the Global Comeptitivness Institute; Hertigage LM 
efficiency: Labour Market efficiency indicator of the Heritage Economic Freedom index; HighEdu: percent of population with tertiary 
education; GCI: Overall competitivness indicator of the Global Competitiveness Institute; Economic Freedom: Economic Freedom Indicator 
of the Fraser institute; Doing Business: Overall World Bank Doing Business indicator; WGI: World Bank Governance Indicators.
Source: Author’s calculations based on European Commission, Eurostat, ECB, OECD, World Bank, Global Competitiveness Institute, 
Heritage foundation, Fraser Institute data.
